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CORPORATION FINANCE:

Reviewed by William W. Bratton, Jr.*
In contemporary corporate law pedagogy, "Corporate Finance" denotes an advanced corporate course combining conventional legal materials on finance with materials on practical and theoretical finance
economics. This was a novel curricular concept when Professors Victor
Brudney and Marvin A. Chirelstein brought out the first edition of their
CorporateFinance casebook in 1973.1 Times have changed. Such mixes
of law and economics have become routine, 2 and Corporate Finance has
joined the establishment of generally offered upper-class law school
courses. 3 Law students associate Corporate Finance with Securities Regulation as a portal to corporate practice. 4 The second edition of the
Brudney and Chirelstein casebook, brought out in 1979, has entered middle age. And with the recent publication of Professor Robert W. Hamil*
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A.B. 1973, J.D. 1976, Columbia University. Thanks to Chuck Yablon and Paul Shupack for helpful
comments.
1. V. BRUDNEY & M. CHIRELSTEIN, CASES AND MATERIALS ON CORPORATE FINANCE (lst
ed. 1972). The book is in its second edition. See V. BRUDNEY & M. CHIRELSTEIN, CASES AND
MATERIALS ON CORPORATE FINANCE (2d ed. 1979) [hereinafter cited as BRUDNEY & CHIRELSTEIN, CORPORATE FINANCE].
2. See, eag., J. COx, FINANCIAL INFORMATION, ACCOUNTING AND THE LAW: CASES AND
MATERIALS 145-89 (1980) (takes care to present valuation and the efficient market hypothesis); R.
POSNER & K. ScoTr, ECONOMICS OF CORPORATION LAW AND SECURITIES REGULATION (1980)
(text for a course devoted to corporate law and economics); L. SOLOMON, R. STEVENSON, & D.
SCHWARTZ, CORPORATIONS, LAW AND POLICIES: MATERIALS AND PROBLEMS 68-92 (1982) (contains an excellent introduction to valuation); id. at 94-96, 132-34, 865-72 (includes the "Chicago
school" point of view on a number of issues); see also R. POZEN, FINANCIAL INSTITUTIONS: CASES
MATERIALS AND PROBLEMS ON INVESTMENT MANAGEMENT (1978); D. RATNER, INSTITUTIONAL
INVESTORS: TEACHING MATERIALS (1978).
3. Two hundred twenty-one full-time law teachers listed it on their resumes in ASSOCIATION
OF AMERICAN LAW SCHOOLS, DIRECTORY OF LAW TEACHERS (1983). One hundred thirty-four of
this group were listed as current teachers of the course during the 1983-84 school year. The total is
smaller than the total listed in the Directory under "Corporate Finance" because the heading includes a number of business courses other than Corporate Finance, among them Business Planning
and Corporate Reorganizations. The Directory lists two hundred twenty-five teachers of Securities
Regulation.
4. Oddly, some of those students convinced that the course is essential to their career preparation will be going to work for corporate practitioners who have no idea that the course exists.
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ton's Corporation Finance,5 the little community of corporate finance
instructors even has a choice of casebooks.

This review essay takes the occasion of the publication of Hamilton's book to comment on the concept of the Corporate Finance course
that shapes both books. The essay first looks at the course Brudney and

Chirelstein introduced, explicating their accomplishment. 6 Then it explores the Hamilton alternative. 7 Finally, it notes and questions the lim8
its of the curricular concept and suggests some expansions.

I.

THE CURRICULAR CONCEPT

A traditional set of corporate finance teaching materials is available
in the back pages of the Cary Corporations casebook. 9 One doubts that
these pages are widely read; they were gathering dust when the Brudney
and Chirelstein book came along in 1973. Postwar growth in the quantity of law governing shareholder/management relationships had
squeezed them out of the four-hour Corporations syllabus. 10 With proxy
rules, majority shareholder duties, and insider trading prohibitions to be
dealt with, little time remained for mergers and acquisitions, and even
less for senior securities, legal capital, dividend regulation, and recapitalizations. Brudney and Chirelstein solved this timing problem by removing the finance materials into a new "advanced corporations" format.
Their book also addressed a more substantial problem. In 1973,
corporate law teaching materials did not promote discourse on a particularly compelling level.11 Merely bifurcating the Corporations course
would have done little to enliven or enrich things. Fortunately, finance
economics stood ready to facilitate an advance in the level of discussion
in much the same way price economics already had advanced the discussion in the antitrust area. Brudney and Chirelstein recognized this and
integrated the subject matter at the back of the Cary casebook with the
basic points made by an introductory finance text. These materials have
5. R. HAMILTON, CORPORATION FINANCE: CASES AND MATERIALS

(1984).

6. See infra notes 9-37 and accompanying text.
7. See infra notes 38-47 and accompanying text.
8. See infra notes 48-87 and accompanying text.
9. See W. CARY & M. EISENBERG, CASES AND MATERIALS ON CORPORATIONS 1015-639
(5th ed. unabr. 1980).
10. We see this phenomenon by comparing the third and fourth editions of the Cary text. The
third edition, published in 1959, wraps up fiduciary duty and insider trading by page 626 and derivative suits by page 753. R. BAKER & W. CARY, CASES AND MATERIALS ON CORPORATIONS (3d ed.
1959). The corresponding pages in the fourth edition are 867 and 1029. W. CARY, CASES AND
MATERIALS ON CORPORATIONS (4th ed. 1969).
11. See Chisum, Book Review, 86 HARV. L. REv. 1103, 1103-04 (1973) (review of the first
edition of the Brudney & Chirelstein casebook in which the author notes that few law students were
inspired to go beyond the basic corporations course).

Vol. 1985:237]

CORPORA TE FINANCE

a natural affinity: The integrated unit erases the memory of the rationale
behind the old regime of separate pedagogy.
CorporateFinance is a casebook in the grand style, one of the rare
"theme" casebooks that brings its collection of materials inside an overarching evaluative framework. 12 The organizational touchstone is the
goal of value maximization. The book takes the value-maximizing decision, breaks it into its component parts, and then displays it in operation
in various investment and financial contexts. Legal and business contexts
are included and courts and administrative agencies are juxtaposed with
corporate managers, investors, and portfolio managers in the role of
value-maximizing decisionmakers.
The first part of the book is a treatment of valuation and illustrates
this heuristic technique. It offers a step-by-step exposition of valuation in
the manner of an introductory finance textbook, starting with discounting and compounding and building to risk and return. 13 This introduction to the analytical tools utilized in business decisionmaking is
sandwiched between two vintage examples of valuation in legal decisionmaking. One is an SEC advisory report in a corporate reorganization
proceeding 14 and the other is an appellate opinion in a Delaware merger
appraisal proceeding. 15 Complex valuations directly determine legal
rights in both cases. The juxtaposed business and legal materials invite a
multifaceted Socratic exercise. The business materials show the student
that business practice determines values. From there it follows that to
the extent it seeks to approximate real-world economic results, legal valuation must be informed by business practice. This conclusion prompts a
critique of the legal materials: The students apply their knowledge of the
business mechanics against old legal valuation standards not consistent
with business practice. By the conclusion of the exercise, they have constructed for themselves the revised approach to valuation currently operative in "advanced" legal opinion.1 6 In the process, any lines in the
students' minds separating corporate legal policy and economic reality
have disappeared.
12. Another such rarity is H. HART & H. WECHSLER, THE FEDERAL COURTS AND THE FEDERAL SYSTEM (1953), which introduced the now orthodox Federal Courts course.
13. BRUDNEY & CHIRELSTEIN, CORPORATE FINANCE, supra note 1, at 35-78.
14. Id. at 6-30 (excerpting In re Atlas Pipeline Corp., 9 S.E.C. 416 (1941)).
15. Id. at 70-73, 567-78 (excerpting Francis I. Du Pont & Co. v. Universal City Studios, Inc.,
312 A.2d 344 (Del. Ch. 1973), af'd, 334 A.2d 216 (Del. 1975)).
16. See, e.g., Weinberger v. UOP, Inc., 457 A.2d 701, 712-13 (Del. 1983) (repudiating the Delaware block approach to valuation "to the extent it excludes other generally accepted techniques used
in the financial community"); N.Y. Bus. CORP. LAW § 623(h)(4) (McKinney Supp. 1983) ("fair
value" of shares in appraisal proceeding to be determined in accordance with "the concepts and
methods then customary in the relevant securities and financial markets").
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These materials pose basic questions on another level. They illustrate the difficulties that result when legal decisionmakers make investment and financing decisions while simultaneously balancing competing
economic interests within a normative framework. The student gets the
message that one party's value maximizing decisions sometimes come at
the expense of other parties with equally legitimate interests in the enterprise. And the student begins to appreciate that perfectly fair results are
elusive when corporate pie-slicing contests are fought in legal arenas.
The main body of the book contains a succession of corporate and
securities law topics, each offered as an exercise in understanding the
interrelations of the law and value-maximizing decisionmaking. Thus,
the student is introduced to contract and corporate law of long-term debt
and preferred stock, 17 and to statutes and cases regulating capital struc20
ture,18 dividends, 19 and mergers and other corporate combinations.
Then the student is introduced to federal regulation of the flow of information in securities markets, particularly security registration requirements and insider trading prohibitions. 2 1 Finance theory complicates the
22
picture frequently.
Brudney and Chirelstein enrich the discussion further by drawing
on doctrinal materials from outside the traditional corporate and securities law categories. They round out their picture of corporate debtorcreditor relationships with materials on bankruptcy reorganization. 2 3 In
building a picture of the regulation of capital structure they draw on the
"regulated industries," in particular, materials on regulation of public
utilities and banks.24 This doctrinal outreach contributes to the valuation theme by illustrating the behavior of legal decisionmakers vested
with primary investment and financial decisionmaking authority. Corporate law materials, molded by the business judgment tradition and a narrower set of policy concerns, cannot provide such illustrations.
17. BRUDNEY & CHIRELSTEIN, CORPORATE FINANCE, supra note 1, at 79-262.
18. Id at 263-415.
19. Id. at 416-501.
20. Id at 502-772.
21. Id at 773-1235.
22. For example, consideration of the regulation of capital structure is enlivened by an exposition of the Modigliani-Miller proposition that capital structure is irrelevant to firm value. Id. at 387.
409, 438-42. Similarly, materials on the regulation of the securities markets and market professionals are followed by portfolio theory and the efficient markets hypothesis, the theorists' explications of

the effect of value-maximizing behavior in the context of competitive securities markets. Id. at 1143.
93.
23. Id at 123-70.
24. Id at 331-80.
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The Brudney and Chirelstein book wears well. It provides good service to each of its three constituencies: academically oriented law students, career-oriented law students, and legal educators.
The book rewards the efforts of students inhabited by the spirit of
normative inquiry with a better understanding of the costs and benefits of
business regulation. Brudney and Chirelstein convey a sense of their
scholarly interests to these students even while acting in the limited role
of editors and occasional commentators. 25 Their scholarship combines
technical command of corporate law and business practice with sophisticated normative jurisprudence in the contemporary "fairness versus efficiency" mold. They break down and rebuild the legal literature's
oversimplified models of business reality and offer revised models more
cognizant of real world complexities. Then they work fairness-versusefficiency conflicts through these models with sensitivity to both eco-

nomic and jurisprudential nuances. Their casebook asks students to perform similar analytical exercises on a smaller scale. Its overlay of
practical and theoretical economics provides ground for a critique of the
crude visions of reality operative in the legal materials, and the legal
materials give rise to successive fairness-versus-efficiency discussions.

Brudney and Chirelstein often display an anti-managerial moral and
political disposition in their scholarship. When working in this mode
they often prove willing to abandon the tailored jurisprudence of stan-

dards for less well-fitting but more easily applied rules.26 Fortunately,

they keep this anti-managerialism well into the background in their

casebook. Nothing inhibits participation by students with management25. Here "Brudney and Chirelstein" are referred to collectively, working both in collaboration
and separately. The remarks in the text stem from my experience with, inter alia, Brudney & Chirelstein, A Restatementof CorporateFreezeouts, 87 YALE L.J. 1354 (1978) [hereinafter cited as Brudney
& Chirelstein, Freezeouts], Brudney & Chirelstein, FairShares in CorporateMergers and Takeovers,
88 HARv. L. REv. 297 (1974) [hereinafter cited as Brudney & Chirelstein, FairShares], Brudney,
Equal Treatment ofShareholdersin CorporateDistributionsandReorganizations,71 CALIF. L. REV.
1072 (1983) [hereinafter cited as Brudney, Equal Treatment], Brudney, Dividends, Discretion, and
Disclosure, 66 VA. L. REV. 85 (1980) [hereinafter cited as Brudney, Dividends], and Chirelstein,
Towards a FederalFiduciaryStandardsAct, 30 CLEV. ST. L. REv. 203 (1981).
26. See, eg., Brudney & Chirelstein, Freezeouts, supra note 25, at 1365 (suggesting that all
"going private" transactions be prohibited); Brudney & Chirelstein, FairShares,supra note 25, at
313-25 (suggesting that gains resulting from mergers of subsidiaries into parent corporations be divided equally between parent and the subsidiary as a percentage of premerger values); Brudney,
Dividends,supra note 25, at 129 (impossibility of regulating management dividend decisions leads to
recommendation of requirement of disclosure of reasons behind dividend decisions); Brudney &
Clark, A New Look at Corporate Opportunities, 94 HARV. L. REV. 997, 1022-42 (1981) (recommending categorical prohibition of full-time executives of public corporations from taking any other
active business opportunities); Chirelstein, supra note 25, at 205-17 (recommending abandonment of
common law fiduciary duty and fairness standards restricting managers in favor of legislated rules or
standards of a more specific character).

242
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protective dispositions when the time comes to propose norms in Corporate Finance class.

Next we consider the corps of career-oriented law students taking
Corporate Finance as they mark time on the way to corporate practice in
large law firms. Few of these students care that interdisciplinary study

holds out opportunities for enriched discourse on law and policy. But
the Brudney and Chirelstein concept of the course appeals to them never-

theless. They sense that its economic dimension contributes to their
training as practitioners.

In fact, economic theory does bear on the corporate practice in
which these students eventually will engage, even though such practice
will draw few into full-fledged business decisionmaking. Those employed
in large legal institutions will be drafting debt contracts, representing
lOb-5 defendants, closing leveraged lease deals, packaging tax shelters

and fighting legal battles for corporate control. The economic materials
in the Brudney and Chirelstein book introduce them to the sources of

value in these transactions. Exposure to the materials will enhance their
understanding of the economic decisionmaking process of which their

legal work will be a component. It will also enhance their understanding
of the actions and motivations of their future clients. Thus, the students
should emerge better able to design and supervise valuable transactions
for their clients. 27 They will be rewarded for their diligence in Corporate
Finance with a marginal increase in professional effectiveness.
The Brudney and Chirelstein course may perform an additional pro-

fessional function. Corporate lawyers have complicated relationships
with their clients-the managers of business corporations. The lawyers
want to provide management with satisfactory service at the highest possible price. They also strive for professional autonomy 28 and a residuum
of control over managerial conduct. 29 These aims tend to be inconsis27. For a transaction cost justification of corporate lawyering, see Gilson, Value Creation by
Business Lawyer" Legal Skills and Asset Pricing,94 YALE L.J. 239 (1984).
28. Complete autonomy is never achieved, of course. Although not yet a regulated industry,
the legal profession is far from accountable only to itself. See G. HAZARD, ETHICS IN THE PRACTICE OF LAW xiv-xv, 15-19 (1978) (lawyers are constrained by their duties to, and dependence on,
legal educators, employers, insurers, the organized bar, and the public at large).
29. One of corporate law's functions-and perhaps its most important function-is to facilitate
control of the power corporate managers wield in society. See generally Frug, The Ideology of Bureaucracyin American Law, 97 HARv. L. REV. 1276 (1984) (arguing that corporate and administrative law, as defenders of the wielders of bureaucratic power, are actually deceptions which mask the
nondemocratic nature of bureaucratic power). As the keeper of corporate law, in legislatures,
courts, government agencies, and law offices, the legal profession wields this power against managers. Private practitioners share in this exercise even while acting as management attorneys when
giving advice or giving (or withholding) opinions. Despite the awkwardness of their position, one
detects no movement among corporate practitioners toward abandonment of the power they exercise
in their relationships with their clients.
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tent. As a result, the legal profession has difficulty maintaining friendly
relationships with managers and simultaneously satisfying all of its professional aims. Widespread inclusion of elementary finance in the law
school curriculum signifies a slight retreat in the legal profession's claim
to autonomous power over business. The legal profession wields less
power to the extent it disables itself from imposing its uninformed intuitions. By teaching itself finance it admits that sensitivity to the constraints on the business profession may be necessary when lawyers
formulate legal norms. But the retreat is only strategic. By informing
itself, the legal profession gains authority when it seeks to impose its will
on unwilling business persons. Furthermore, knowledge of elementary
finance gives corporate practitioners an expanded base of shared intellectual experience with their professionally-educated business employers. If
some increased sense of solidarity between attorney and business client
results, the lawyers emerge with a better foundation upon which to work
their balancing act.
In any event, successful innovations in legal pedagogy tend to become self-justifying to professionally-oriented students (and educators).
A process of intellectual assimilation between law school and law office
may occur, turning what at first seemed a purely academic project into
an essential for practical lawyering. 30 In the case of the Brudney and
Chirelstein Corporate Finance course, the process might work as follows:
in 1973 an innovative casebook designed to deepen the student's understanding of the law by presenting the doctrine in its wider context appears. Students of the book carry their deepened understanding and the
economic ideas behind it with them into practice. Ideas from the
casebook start to find their way into litigators' briefs. Finally, the ideas
begin to appear in the case law. Eventually a utilitarian corner is turned
and the ideas go into the grab bag of notions and rhetorical devices routinely utilized in arguing and deciding cases. They become stock in the
corporate lawyer's trade, and what was once academic theory is now another part of "real world" practitioner training.
The Brudney and Chirelstein course may already have reached an
advanced stage in this process of assimilation. Hamilton notes that the
efficient markets notion (one of the theoretical goods purveyed by Brudney and Chirelstein) has been important in a number of well-known

opinions.

31

30. The Federal Courts course, invented only in 1953, comes to mind. See supra note 12.
31. R. HAMILTON, supra note 5, at 209 n.8; see also Gilson & Kraakman, The Mechanisms of
Market Efficiency, 70 VA. L. REv. 549, 549-50 (1984) (discussing the broad acceptance by the legal
community of the efficient capital markets theory).
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Finally, we consider the influence of the Corporate Finance course
on the scholarly development of the Corporate Finance instructor. The
precise role the Brudney and Chirelstein book has played in nurturing
scholarship is difficult to ascertain. 32 Although significant academic
work employed economic theory to critique corporate law before the
book's appearance in 1973, 33 the quantity of such work has increased

significantly since then. Of course, many variables figure into the etiology of this growth. Not the least among these is the growth of interest
among legal academics in the study of ideas from other fields. 34 But

widespread adoption of the Brudney and Chirelstein book must be
counted among these variables as well. Much scholarly enterprise has its

genesis in problems discovered and inadequately resolved in teaching. 35
Ties to the Corporate Finance course36 can be detected in and around

much recent work on financial topics.
Let us also consider a hypothetical legal educator who does not
teach the Corporate Finance course but who concerns himself with the
overall position of the law school in the educational and professional
32. The necessary survey of Corporate Finance instructors has not been undertaken in connection with the preparation of this essay. Causal empiricism has been employed. See infra note 36 and
accompanying text.
33. See, eg., Manne, Mergers and the Market for Corporate Control, 73 J. POL. ECON. 110
(1965) (discussion of economic aspects of mergers); Wu, An Economist Looks at Section 16 of the
Securities Exchange Act of 1934, 68 COLUM. L. REv. 260 (1968) (discussion of economic issues

related to insider trading).
34. Such interest has become particularly keen in the corporate area as prominent economists
have taken up the study of corporate legal structure. See sources cited infra note 83.
35. Scholarly enterprise also can make the teacher's grasp of what he teaches more secure. For
discussion of the interrelationship of teaching and scholarship, see Kronman, Foreword: Legal
Scholarship and Moral Education, 90 YALE L.J. 955 (1981).
36. The literature on subjects such as tender offers, sales of corporate control, and insider trading does not yield good exemplars for this point. Although these subjects are covered in the Corporate Finance course, they figure too prominently in the everyday academic discourse on corporate
law for a given course or casebook to have had a visible influence.
The less heavily traversed fields of valuation, senior securities, capital structure, and dividends
are central to the Corporate Finance course and, as such, provide a betier proving ground. Here we
have work by a number of Corporate Finance instructors. On dividends, see Brudney, Dividends,
supra note 25 (arguing, using economic as well as legal sources, that disclosure by management of
the reasons for dividend policy will correct stock prices), and Fischel, The Law and Economics of
DividendPolicy, 67 VA. L. REv. 699 (1981) (arguing, in criticism of Brudney, that broad discretion
on management's part in determining dividend policy is preferable (also relying on economic and
financial sources)) [hereinafter cited as Fischel, Dividends]; on the larger structural picture, see
Klein, The Modern Business Organization: Bargaining Under Constraints, 91 YALE LJ. 1521
(1982); on corporate reorganization, see Roe, Bankruptcy and Debt: A New Model for Corporate
Reorganization, 83 COLUM. L. REv. 527 (1983); on valuation, see Haynsworth, Valuation of Busi.
ness Interests, 33 MERCER L. REv. 457 (1982); on bonds, see Bratton, The Economics and Jurisprudence of Convertible Bonds, 1984 Wis. L. REV. 667 [hereinafter cited as Bratton, Convertibles], and
Bratton, The Interpretationof Contracts Governing Corporate Debt Relationships, 5 CARDOZO L.
REv. 371 (1984) [hereinafter cited as Bratton, Interpretation].
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worlds. This educator accepts the law school's traditional dual role as an
academy for legal scholarship and professional education. But he also
envisages it as a "center" for "interaction" not only among teachers and
students but also among practitioners, judges, and perhaps others-bureaucrats, businesspersons, journalists, and politicians. He may be disquieted by the characteristics displayed by much recently published
literature-it looks like jurisprudence and speaks the language of the university's social science or humanities departments rather than that of the
legal profession. He wonders how the law school can continue to be a
professional center if this type of scholarship becomes the norm. As its
faculty's intellectual pursuits extend outside of the professional sphere,
the nature of the professional training the school offers must change.
Less interaction with the constituencies from outside of the university
will occur. But, at least in the corporate area, this legal educator need
not worry inordinately. There, no such chasms will open, and for a
number of reasons. One is economic. The stakes in corporate law policymaking can be high enough to prompt professionals to make the effort
to acquaint themselves with academic discourse. Another reason is pedagogic. Courses like Corporate Finance introduce the next generation of
corporate practitioners to the tenor and concerns of corporate academic
discourse. Such interdisciplinary courses should continue to assist in
37
keeping academic developments accessible to the bar.
II.

THE HAMILTON ALTERNATIVE

The Brudney and Chirelstein book challenges the instructor. Undertaking its full program requires a four-hour format, and the total concentration of everyone involved. The book lends itself to a three-hour
framework only with heavy cuts.
Hamilton's CorporationFinance offers a less daunting, more compact version of the Brudney and Chirelstein model. It covers the same
cluster of financial topics, 38 but it offers a truncated presentation of a
number of them, particularly preferred stock, capital structure, and dividends. The book matches Brudney and Chirelstein's elaborateness only
for mergers and other corporate combinations, where it includes a generous sampling of contemporary commentary on mergers and tender offers.
37. Of course there are many other points of contact. Law review students, on their way to
practice, review and edit much legal academic work. Academics write in practitioner journals.
Practitioners become academics; academics become practitioners.
38. That is, valuation, R. HAMILTON, supra note 5, at 1-54; senior securities, id. at 213-392;
legal capital, id. at 55-129; capital structure, id at 393-429; dividends, id. at 430-94; and mergers and
other corporate combinations, id. at 495-831. Hamilton departs from the Brudney and Chirelstein
model to include a chapter on close corporation financial matters, id at 130-67.
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The federal securities law topics Brudney and Chirelstein treat extensively are dispensed with. Hamilton thus affirms the Brudney and
Chirelstein concept of the course, but adapts it for instructors preferring
a slow, steady, and thorough advance through course materials. A class
can be conducted adagio through the entire Hamilton book in a threehour framework. Take the book andante con spirito and one can teach it
in two.
Hamilton's variation on the Brudney and Chirelstein course concept
reflects a number of differences in pedagogic temperament. For example,
Hamilton does not attempt to replicate the overarching valuation theme.
He is also less Socratic in his presentation. Brudney and Chirelstein
often inundate the student with variegated economic, legal, and moral
principles, 39 bidding her to figure it all out herself. Hamilton sometimes
makes similarly traditional demands, but tends to present a more easily
manageable data base when he does so 4° and occasionally abandons the
game altogether, choosing scholarly summaries that present the points
41
neatly.
Hamilton also reshapes the manner in which interrelated legal and
economic materials are presented. Brudney and Chirelstein, despite all
their substantive innovations, tend to organize their materials in the
time-honored manner of casebooks. "Principal cases" are followed by
"notes" containing "materials" that assist analysis of the issues in the
"principal cases." This format implies that the case is the primary substantive concern. But the implication can be misleading in Brudney and
Chirelstein's substantive construct, for the economic materials often
prove as interesting as the principal cases. Hamilton arranges his materials more flexibly, implying substantive parity between legal and economic materials.4 2
39. Brudney and Chirelstein's presentations of valuation, discussed in the text accompanying
notes 13-16 supra, and capital structure, discussed in note 42 infra, are examples. See also infra note

40.
40. Compare Hamilton on preferred stock, R. HAMILTON, supra note 5, at 213-56, capital
structure, ia at 393-429, and dividends, id. at 430-55, with Brudney and Chirelstein on the same
subjects. BRUDNEY AND CHIRELSTEIN, CORPORATE FINANCE, supra note 1, at 174-244, 317-415,
416-54.
41. For example, Hamilton relies on Roe, Bankruptcy andDebt, supra note 36, to explain chapter 11 reorganization proceedings. R. HAMILTON, supra note 5, at 307-16. See also Hamilton's
treatment of valuation, discussed in note 45 infra.
42. Hamilton's organizational flexibility also may stem from sensitivity to the limited attention
spans of some law students. Brudney and Chirelstein's adherence to traditional casebook organization sometimes results in 50 or 100 page agglomerations of interrelated material that the student

must assimilate as a single exercise. Hamilton tends to break things down. He will acquaint the
student with the business dynamic in one exercise, and go on to the legal application of the business
point in a subsequent assignment.
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Comparing the two books' treatments of valuation provides a finer
sense of the choice they pose. Both start with the subject and both intro-

duce the student to the basic economic principles. Both show that the
inexact nature of the science causes difficulties when valuation disputes

arise in legal contexts. The books employ very different means to these
ends, however. Brudney and Chirelstein draw on the business textbook,

bringing over the elementary business exercise complete with formulas
and tables. The student obtains an understanding of valuation as a component in the process of investment decisionmaking. Brudney and
Chirelstein force the student to self-teach the great interdisciplinary lesson of finance 43 by asking her to bring this understanding to dated legal

materials. 44 The exercise is painful, but the student gains in intellectual
strength. Hamilton introduces valuation less as a pure business phenom-

enon than as a business phenomenon bearing on legal practice. His
materials, taken mostly from the taxation area, clearly summarize the

factors operative in the best contemporary practice of legal valuation.4 5
Because all the variables are laid out in plain view, the exercise pains the

student very little.
The different presentations create different impressions of the world.
In Hamilton's world, valuation is yet another set of factors to be mastered by the legal technician. Expert witnesses provide the facts in this
world. The lawyer's job is to understand this raw material and learn to

manipulate it. Brudney and Chirelstein, in contrast, do not show their
students that authoritative and contemporary legal sources summarize

the economic principles. They ask their students to infuse economic realAs an example, compare the two books' treatments of capital structure. Brudney and Chirelstein offer 98 pages on this, starting with conventional business wisdom about debt-equity ratios,
followed by materials presenting problems with the legal regulation of capital structure, and then
modifying the whole unit with the Modigliani-Miller irrelevance hypothesis. BRUDNEY & CHIRELSTEIN, CORPORATE FINANCE, supra note 1, at 317-415. Hamilton offers the practical business view
first. Next he counterbalances the economic theory. Only then does he bring on the legal material.
It is all over in 37 pages. R. HAMILTON, supra note 5, at 393-429.
43. It should be noted that the 1984 supplement to the book includes the prime exemplars of
the contemporary view, although not as addenda to the valuation chapter. See V. BRUDNEY & M.
CHIRELSTEIN, CASES AND MATERIALS ON CORPORATE FINANCE 54, 62-63, 65-66 (Supp. 1984)
(excerpting Weinberger v. UOP, Inc., 457 A.2d 701 (Del. 1983); N.Y. Bus. CORP. LAW § 623(h)(4)
(McKinney Supp. 1983)) [hereinafter cited as BRUDNEY & CHIRELSTEIN, SUPP. 1984].
44. See supra notes 13-16 and accompanying text.
45. Hamilton gives us quite a collection of lucid expositions of valuation, particularly the "old
man and the tree" parable, R. HAMILTON supra note 5, at 1-7 (excerpt from L. SOLOMON, K STEVENSON, & D. SCHWARTZ, supra note 2, at 83-88), and a case detailing the conflicting valuation
opinions of three highly qualified experts, R. HAMILTON, supra note 5, at 23-31 (Estate of Newcomer v. United States, 447 F. Supp. 1368 (W.D. Pa. 1978)).
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ities into older, more rigid legal concepts. 46 The perceptive student
should take away an enduring skepticism about the soundness of economic assumptions underlying legal doctrine.4 7

III.

FURTHER COMMENTS

A. Senior Securities as Teaching Material
Corporate Finance introduces students to senior securities. The
"law of senior securities," if such a thing may be said to exist, is an amalgam of contract, corporate, trust, and securities law. Its core is contractual. Most of the priorities and other rights that bondholders and
preferred stockholders have against issuers and junior-ranking securityholders are products of investment contracts. In the case of preferred
stock, state corporation law adds a regulatory overlay to this contractual
core. In the case of publicly issued debt securities, heavy regulation of
the contracting process comes from the state law of corporate trust and
the Federal Trust Indenture Act.48 Legal issues can arise in any or all of
these doctrinal arenas when disputes erupt between the senior and junior
securityholders of solvent corporations.
The law of senior securities has a technical complexity that makes it
seem less rewarding from a law teacher's perspective than other corporate material. It appears to lack a compelling policy dimension. But
careful inspection of the relevant legal materials dispels this" impression.
Whether produced by a court, legislature, or private parties at the contract negotiating table, the law relating to senior securities does not differ
in kind from other corporate law. It governs the relations of managers
and securityholders and resolves their pie-slicing contests.
Both casebooks convey this point by drawing primarily on case law
resolving contract disputes over the scope of the senior securityholders'
46. Hamilton creates an opportunity for critique of contemporary corporate law valuation standards by including Piemonte v. New Boston Garden Corp., 377 Mass. 719, 387 N.E.2d 1145 (1979).
R. HAMILTON, supra note 5, at 33-41.
47. The business materials in Brudney & Chirelstein's valuation chapter end with risk and return. The instructor who wants to lay out most of the economic theory at the start of the course can
bring forward from the back of the book the treatment of the Capital Asset Pricing Model (CAPM)
and the efficient capital market hypothesis. See BRUDNEY & CHIRELSTEIN, CORPORATE FINANCE,
supra note 1, at 66-70, 1143-93. The materials dovetail nicely: the CAPM materials take the risk
and return points and work them out logically in the context of a competitive trading market. Introducing these theoretical materials early in the course also enlivens the discussion of all of the succeeding legal materials. Perceiving this, Hamilton places his treatment of the efficient market point
near the front of his book. See R. HAMILTON, supra note 5, at 185-212. He does not include
materials on the CAPM.
48. 15 U.S.C. §§ 77aaa-77bbb (1982).
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rights. 4 9 Such cases arise when management takes action benefiting common stockholders at the expense of a class of bondholders or preferred
stockholders. The governing investment contract fails either to mention
or clearly to prohibit the conduct in question. A disadvantaged senior

securityholder requests judicial intervention in the relationship, raising
an issue in any one of a number of doctrinal frameworks-contract inter-

pretation, contract avoidance, or corporate fiduciary duty. Judicial responses to these senior securityholder claims range along the entire
business law continuum both doctrinally and emotionally. At one end
lies the literalistic mode of Willistonian contract law with its attendant
individualistic associations. At the other end lies the concept of corpo-

rate fiduciary duty with its attendant altruistic associations. There being
no ascendant doctrinal framework, judicial responses have free play.

Both casebooks display the entire range of judicial response. But
they deploy different materials to do so. Brudney and Chirelstein's second edition showed the full range of doctrine and judicial motivation

only in its treatment of preferred stockholder rights. On bondholder
rights it offered only a pair of cases, Aladdin Hotel v. Bloom 5° and Harff

v. Kerkorian,51 decided in 1953 and 1975 respectively. Both cases reject
bondholder claims against opportunistic issuer conduct in strongly individualistic terms. Both teach the bondholders the great Willistonian lesson: next time, look out for yourself with a better-drafted set of contract
provisions. While similarly-minded decisions appear in their preferred

stock materials, those materials also show judges who will not sanction
the opportunistic conduct benefitting the common stockholders. In one

instance, a judge even speaks in terms of a fiduciary duty owed by the
52
issuer to the preferred.

49. A fuller picture would emerge if additional contractual materials were included. See infra
text accompanying notes 79-87.
50. 200 F.2d 627 (8th Cir. 1953); see BRUDNEY & CHIRELSTEIN, CORPORATE FINANCE, supra
note 1, at 85-91.
51. 324 A.2d 215 (Del. Ch. 1974), rev'd, 347 A.2d 133 (Del. 1975); see BRUDNEY & CHIRELSTEIN, CORPORATE FINANCE, supra note 1, at 255-56.
52. At one extreme, we find Judge Frank in Guttmann v. Illinois Cent. R.R. Co., 189 F.2d 927,
930 (2d Cir.) (dismissing the preferred claim with consummate individualism: "[P]referred stockholders are not-like sailors or idiots or infants--wards of the judiciary."), cert denied, 342 U.S. 867
(1951), excerpted in BRUDNEY & CHIRELSTEIN, CORPORATE FINANCE, supra note I, at 181. The
counter-balancing strain of altruism finds only weak expression-a Delaware district judge expressed
concern about the treatment accorded the preferred but felt bound to be tough under state law in
Barrett v. Denver Tramway Corp., 53 F. Supp. 198 (D. Del. 1943), affrd 146 F.2d 701 (3d Cir.
1944), and the Rhode Island Supreme Court found a fiduciary duty owed to the bondholders but did
not manage to apply it so as actually to protect them in Bove v. Community Hotel Corp., 105 R.I.
36, 249 A.2d 89 (1969). See BRUDNEY & CHIRELSTEIN, CORPORATE FINANCE, supra note 1, at
212-26.
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Together, these materials impart the correct impression that an individualistic strain dominates judicial responses to senior security holders'
claims. Comparison of the materials' bond and preferred components
suggests two other points. First, judicial altruism and associated protective doctrines come to the aid of securityholders in increasing intensity as
their interests become more junior in status. This impression may be
correct; at least it can be defended.5 3 Second, bondholders inspire no
altruistic protections. As creditors, they have a wealth of self-protective
devices at their disposal. In contrast, the positive law framework governing preferred stockhlolding inhibits the range of self-protective devices
and accounts for the appearance of the altruism of preferred stock case
law. This impression may have appeared to be correct at one time. But
the last two decades of case law respecting bondholder rights gives rise to
a different, more complex, picture.
Hamilton's book truncates the presentation of preferred stock cases,
but adds a generous sampling of these recent bond cases. 5 4 It presents a
wide-ranging collection of judicial responses to bondholder claims. The
entire spectrum of emotion and doctrine appears from stem individualism and classical contract doctrine through hesitant altruism and the
good-faith duties of neoclassical contract and on to aggressive imposi55
tions of cooperative spirit and corporate law fiduciary duties.
Hamilton's bond cases teach an interesting lesson. Between their
varied and complicated fact patterns and their varied judicial responses,
no conventional doctrinal synthesis can be devised. Legal norms and the
various policies of market regulation underlying them do not determine
judicial intervention in senior-junior securityholder disputes; the individualistic or altruistic disposition of the decisionmaker may be the critical
factor. Individualism, while the dominant mode of judicial response,
shares the scene with a strain of altruistic intervention in the bondholder's favor. Thus, the jurisprudence of high finance contracts differs
53. For a bold illustration, see Green v. Hamilton Int'l Corp., No. 76 Civ. 5433 (S.D.N.Y. July
11, 1981) (available Feb. 8, 1985 on LEXIS, Genfed library, Dist file), in which convertible bondholders are accorded fiduciary protection only where the wrong impinges on the bond's equity
aspect.
54. See R. HAMILTON, supra note 5, at 275-86, 336-92. In order of appearance, the cases are
Sharon Steel Corp. v. Chase Manhattan Bank, N.A., 691 F.2d 1039 (2d Cir. 1982), cert. denied, 103
S. Ct. 1253 (1983), Pittsburgh Terminal Corp. v. Baltimore & O.R.R. Co., 680 F.2d 933 (3d Cir.
1982), cert. denied, 103 S. Ct. 475 (1983), Van Gemert v. Boeing Co., 520 F.2d 1373 (2d Cir.), cert.
denied, 423 U.S. 947 (1975); Broad v. Rockwell Int'l Corp., 642 F.2d 929 (5th Cir.) (en band), cert.
denied, 454 U.S. 965 (1981).
BRUDNEY & CHIRELSTEIN, SUPP. 1984, supra note 43, at 4-15, includes the Pittsburgh Terminal opinions. The Broad fact situation is summarized as a problem. Id. at 16.
55. For detailed discussions, see Bratton, Convertibles, supra note 36, and Bratton, Interpretation, supra note 36.
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contexts than many
less from that of other contractual and corporate
56
Wall Street individualists would like to think.
B. Academic Commentary as Teaching Material.
If we were to set out to collect the best exemplars of the corporate
law discourse of three decades ago we probably would settle on a handful
of judicial opinions. The Swan and Clark opinions in Pearlman v. Feldman 57 come especially to mind. 58 One wonders whether any of the era's
academic work on corporate law also would be included. The academics
who produced it tended to share the jurisprudential and empirical assumptions underlying the judicial opinions on which they commented
and reflected. They offered no explanation of the place of corporate law
in the wider world or the place of the wider world in corporate law. This
left them without the force of ideas to compensate for their lack of power
to tell people what to do. As a result, their commentary held only a
59
secondary place on the law library shelf.
Less and less contemporary academic commentary shares the jurisprudential and empirical assumptions of judicial opinions. Much of it
reaches outside of the traditional body of corporate law in search of expanded empirical knowledge and normative inspiration. While not "real
law" like cases and statutes, it can have the independent force of insight.
Surely the most compelling discourse in this decade's legal financial literature is that between scholars of the Chicago school-Professors Frank
Easterbrook and Daniel Fischel most notably-and their opponentsamong whom Professor Victor Brudney figures prominently. 60 One
doubts whether any of today's judicial opinions will achieve similar
56. Enhanced understanding of the dynamic of decisionmaking operative in the cases respecting bonds and preferred calls for a relational rather than a doctrinal inquiry. For relational inquiries
respecting senior securities, see Bratton, Convertibles,supra note 36, at 672-719; Brudney, Standards
ofFairnessandthe Limits ofPreferredStock Modifications, 26 RUTGERS L. REV. 445, 448-50 (1973);
Carlson, A Theory of ContractualDebt and Lien Subordination, 38 VAND. L. REv. (forthcoming
1985). On relational scholarship in general, see MacNeil, RelationalContract: What We Do and Do
Not Know, 1985 Wis. L. REv. (forthcoming).
57. 219 F.2d 173 (2d Cir. 1955) (Clark, C.J.); id. at 178-80 (Swan, J., dissenting).
58. The Newport Steel lOb-5 case, Birnbaum v. Newport Steel Corp., 193 F.2d 461 (2d Cir.
1952), might also be included. The other leading corporate opinions of the 1950's tend to come from
state courts, federal rights of action not yet having proliferated widely. See, eg., Campbell v.
Loew's, Inc., 36 Del. Ch. 563, 134 A.2d 852 (1957); In re Auer v. Dressel, 306 N.Y. 427, 118 N.E.2d
590 (1954).
59. Berle is the exception. See A. BERLE, POWER WiTHOUT PROPERTY 1-26 (1959).
60. Compare Brudney, Equal Treatment,supra note 25, with Easterbrook & Fischel, Corporate
Control Transactions, 91 YALE L.J. 698 (1982); Brudney, Dividends, supra note 25, with Fischel,
Dividends, supra note 36.
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status.6 1
This shift in the balance of influence on the law library's shelves has
implications for advanced corporate law pedagogy. If the most interesting ideas on the subject cannot be culled from cases and statutes, and if
finding these ideas requires reference to scholarly materials, it follows
that the scholarly materials should be integrated into the syllabus. As
the curricular context becomes more advanced, this case gets stronger.
By the time students take Corporate Finance they know how to read
cases and statutes and talk policy; expanding the academic scope of the
courses does not impair their professional training. Accomplishing an
integrated approach will improve professional cohesion by cultivating an
appreciation for advanced scholarship in the next generation of
practitioners.
None of this should come as news to Brudney and Chirelstein,
whose book includes much scholarship. 62 Hamilton includes even more.
Indeed, it is in the scholarly component that we finally detect an overarching theme in Hamilton's book. Unlike Brudney and Chirelstein,
who direct attention to economic and legal actors making decisions affecting value, Hamilton directs attention to economic and legal scholars
making assertions regarding the regulation of economic actors. Hamilton shows that the Chicago school's critique bears on every governmental intervention in financial matters. The student, whatever his or her
judgment regarding the critique's ultimate merits, learns that the Chicago School cannot be ignored in any serious discourse on corporate law,
at least at present.
Hamilton develops the theme as follows: he starts early in the book
with an exposition of the efficient markets hypothesis in its various versions. Some material highlights the claim that a body of empirical research substantiates the theory; 63 other excerpts present empirical
critiques of the hypothesis. 64 Hamilton keeps the hypothesis, and its ethical implications, in front of the student working through the cases on
65
publicly traded bonds and preferred stock.
61. Putting this another way, academics in the corporate area used to worry about what judges
thought; now they worry about what other academics think.
62. For a summary, see BRUDNEY & CHIRELSTEIN, CORPORATE FINANCE, supra note 1, at
xix-xxii.
63. R. HAMILTON, supra note 5, at 185-97.
64. Id. at 199-207. The principal source in favor of the hypothesis is Note, The Efficient Capital Market Hypothesis, Economic Theory and the Regulation of the Securities Industry, 29 STAN. L.
REv. 1031 (1977); against the hypothesis is Lowenstein, PruningDeadwoodin Hostile Takeovers: A
Proposalfor Legislation, 83 COLUM. L. REV. 249 (1983).
65. R. HAMILTON, supra note 5, at 229, 256 n.3, 328.
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Predictably, the Chicago school's profile looms larger when the
book reaches the subjects it has taken up most aggressively-transfers of
control and corporate combinations. The school's critique rests on two
basic assertions about the financial world: the market for corporate control creates wealth by transferring assets to their highest valuing users;
and, changes in corporate control should be explained as efforts by rational profit maximizers to reduce agency costs. Hamilton shows Professor Fischel applying these assertions to approve the conduct of the
acquiring corporation in the freeze-out merger, 66 of management in going-private transactions, 67 of controlling shareholders in sales 68 and other
dispositions 69 of control, and, of course, of offerors in tender offers. 70
Hamilton includes contrasting scholarship, most importantly that of Professor Lowenstein, only on the latter point.71
This collection of material gives a working introduction to contemporary corporate law academic discourse. It should advance a number of

other valuable pedagogic goals as well. The materials selected emphasize
the key role empirical studies play in the debate. The student learns that

justifiable market regulation must be based on understanding the nature
of the market's operations and that the requisite level of understanding
requires research. The student also is shown that empirical economic
studies do exist. One hopes the student takes away both scruples against
the lawyer's practice of transforming personal empirical impressions into

assertions of scientific truth, and skepticism regarding broad policy arguments based on narrow empirical studies.
Hamilton's presentation of the scholarship has an unfortunate onesidedness, however. Everything is Easterbrook and Fischel on the attack, wielding microeconomics against the old fairness intuitions. One
66. Id. at 584-86 (excerpting Fischel, The "Race to the Bottom" Revisited: Reflections on Recent Developments in Delaware's CorporationLaw, 76 Nw. U.L. REv. 913 (1982)).
67. R. HAMILTON, supra note 5, at 611-13 (excerpting Fisehel, supra note 66).
68. Id at 634-37, 646-47 (excerpting Easterbrook & Fischel, Corporate Control,supra note 60).
69. Id. at 656-57 (excerpting Easterbrook & Fischel, CorporateControl,supra note 60).
70. R. HAMILTON, supra note 5, at 694-99, 793-95 (excerpting Easterbrook & Fischel, Takeover
Bids, Defensive Tactics, and Shareholder'sWelfare, 36 Bus. LAW 1733 (1981)). We also hear from
other members of the Chicago school and receive a taste of its internal discussions on the precise
legal blueprint necessary for optimal operation of the market for corporate control. See R. HAMILTON, supra note 5, at 795-99 (excerpting Gilson, A StructuralApproach to Corporations: The Case
Against Defensive Tactics in Tender Offers, 33 STAN. L. REV. 819, 844-46 (1981), and Bebchuk, The
Casefor FacilitatingCompeting Tender Offers, 95 HARV. L. REv. 1028, 1054-56 (1982)).
71. HAMILTON, supra note 5, at 703-07 (excerpting Lowenstein, PruningDeadwood in Hostile
Takeovers: A Proposalfor Legislation, 83 COLUM. L. REv. 249 (1983) (challenging the conclusions
Easterbrook and Fischel draw from empirical research on the operation of the market for corporate
control and offering a broader picture of the motivations driving that market). Similar points made
in SEC ADvIsoRY COMMrrrEE ON TENDER OFFERS, REPORT OF RECOMMENDATION (1983) are
included by Hamilton. See R. HAMILTON, supra note 5, at 707-13.
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gets the impression that most voices on the other side have lapsed into
stunned silence, although nothing of the sort has occurred. The book's
picture of the contemporary debate would have had greater verisimilitude and depth had Hamilton brought others-Brudney, for example72
to assist Lowenstein in the defensive role.
Of course, canny pedagogy may lie behind Hamilton's one-sidedness. The book's silences give the instructor the privilege of building the
response to the Chicago school's assertions in class. This approach
leaves the instructor at center stage with the materials providing a basis
for lively debate. The book puts on the table the Chicago school's claim
to possess scientific theory that determines correct dispositions of corporate law issues. The case against this claim can be developed easily
enough through the usual combination of Socratic questioning, manipulation of student commentary, and occasional lecture. General discussion of the appropriate place of the Chicago school's insights in corporate
jurisprudence should follow.
A little well-placed assistance in the casebook could propel this discussion to a higher level of sophistication. 73 For example, Hamilton's
presentation of the efficient markets discussion closes with Easterbrook
and Jarrell stating that no market is absolutely efficient. 74 The Chicago
school retreats from its black-and-white vision with this concession. As
these shades of gray start to emerge in its picture of market operations,
the school's normative challenge against market regulation loses intensity. 7 5 Market efficiency devolves into a "factor" in a conventional policy
dispute in which fairness and efficiency weigh against one another. A
new question arises: if everyone agrees that securities markets tend to be
very efficient, disputing only small matters of the degree of efficiency, and
if when a market is "very" as opposed to "perfectly" efficient its effi72. For example, the Easterbrook & Fischel commentary on going-private sales and other dis.

positions of control, see supra notes 56-57 and accompanying text, could be counterbalanced with
excerpts from Brudney, Equal Treatment, supra note 25, at 1091-98, 1122-26.
Coffee, Regulating the Marketfor CorporateControl A CriticalAssessment of the Tender Offer's

Role in Corporate Governance, 84 COLUM. L. REv. 1145 (1984), was published after the Hamilton
book. It might be utilized to enhance the tender offer discussion in the next edition.

73. Hamilton takes a small step in this direction with an excerpt from Kitch, The Intellectual
Foundationsof "Law and Economics," 33 J. LEGAL EDUC. 184, 194-95 (1983) (noting a few phenomena not yet worked into the fabric of efficient market theory), excerpted in R. HAMILTON, supra,
note 5, at 197-98.
74. R. HAMILTON, supra note 5, at 211.
75. Recent literature develops both the more complex picture of market operations and its
normative implications. See Gilson & Kraakman, supra note 31. Responding to this article, Professor Levmore questions whether the efficient market hypothesis should be accorded any normative
significance at all. Levmore, Efficient Markets and Puzzling Intermediaries,70 VA. L. REV. 645,

656-57 (1984). As already noted, see supra note 73, the Hamilton book makes a bow in the direction
of this more sophisticated strain of scholarship.
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ciency leads to no normative imperative, then exactly what lies behind
the Chicago school's critique? We see in the root and branch attack on
regulation not the product of scientific inquiry but the product of a particular world view. What are its constituent elements and do the world
views underlying opposing corporate law scholarship differ in any material respect?
76
Corporate law literature offers little assistance on these questions.
It tends to concern itself only with finding and defending "correct" answers to discrete regulatory questions. But discussion of the appropriate
normative place of the efficiency principle and of the individualist polit77
ical motivations of its most fervent proponents does exist in other fields.
Of course such commentary does not directly address corporate law issues. But its important bearing on the meaning of the Chicago school's
corporate critique requires us to be flexible regarding subject matter barriers. Once we go so far as to introduce our students to the Chicago
school and its opponents we might as well take the small further step of
introducing them simultaneously to the deeper critique of the meaning of
such legal scholarship.
C. Contract Relationshipsas Teaching Material.
The almost exclusive emphasis on cases, statutes, and other "real
law" in legal education distorts its presentation of business relationships.
The more sophisticated these relationships become, the more contracts
displace "real law" as the primary source of governing rules. Teaching
only the "real law" obscures significant components of the overall
relationship.
Let us consider two subjects as to which the corporate law curriculum omits significant contractual components: close corporation planning and the jurisprudence of information. The Corporations course
teaches close corporation planning by focusing on cases and statutes,
even though the shareholders' agreement is the relational mainspring.
The casebooks deal with the contractual component by describing provisions likely to be found in these agreements, rather than by including a
76. Romano, Metapolitics and CorporateLaw Reform, 36 STAN. L. REV. 923 (1984), is a significant exception. This work elaborates a typology of the different conceptions of democratic organization that underlie corporate law scholarship. Professor Romano's discussion of the conceptual
schism between welfare state pluralists and minimal state pluralists, id. at 942-45, could be drawn on
to impart an understanding of the world views that motivate contemporary academic discourse on
corporate law.

77. See the discussions of the law and economics movement in Symposium on Efficiency as a
Legal Concern, 8 HoFsrRA L. REv. 485 (1980). See also Frug, supra note 29, at 1355-77, offering

the views of an adherent of Critical Legal Studies on "market/pluralist" theories for control of
corporate management.
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contract specimen or parts thereof.7 8 The books, in effect, bid the student to study the contractual component only insofar as it bears on the
"real law." As a result, the student takes away a thorough understanding of the law that enables, validates, and enforces contracts among
shareholders, but gains only a hazy notion of the economic interests at
stake and the bargaining dynamic and legal devices that bring about their
adjustment.
The corporate curriculum teaches information disclosures by sellers
and issuers of securities as a part of the field regulated by the federal
securities laws. Private contract structures serving the same regulatory
function-the representations and warranties of the large financing-are
not customarily employed in teaching. 79 Nor, despite extensive discussion of materiality in the federal law context, does the curriculum offer
examples of these contracts to demonstrate concretely what real parties
think is important. As a result, the student takes away a stilted view of
the jurisprudence of information. She sees buyer protection as almost
entirely a matter of paternalistic federal intervention, and does not see
the complementary regime of two-fisted bargaining over information disclosure that completes the picture.
Both Corporate Finance books follow the traditional "real law" approach, even as they teach relationships subject to substantial contractual
governance-the relationships of issuers and holders of debt securities, of
issuers and preferred stockholders, of partners to mergers, and of parties
to asset sale agreements and stock purchase agreements. The books recognize the existence of contracts governing these relationships, but supply only cursory descriptions of their contents. No specimens are
included. Student efforts are limited to the "real law" governing these
relationships. Although resulting gaps and points of confusion remain
relatively innocuous in the case of mergers, they become more substantial
with asset sales, preferred stock, and debt.
78. See, e-g., W. CARY & M. EISENBERG, supra note 9, at 366-517; A. CONARD, R. KNAUSS, &
S. SIEGEL, ENTERPRISE ORGANIZATION 770-813 (2d ed. 1977); R. HAMILTON, CASES AND MATERIALS ON CORPORATIONS, INCLUDING PARTNERSHIPS AND LIMITED PARTNERSHIPS 344-480 (2d ed.
1981); H. HENN, CASES AND MATERIALS ON THE LAWS OF CORPORATIONS 601-709 (1974) (containing a sample deadlock provision at 690-91); A. FREY, J. CHOPER, N. LEECH, & C. MORRIS,

CASES AND MATERIALS ON CORPORATIONS 519-652 (2d ed. 1977); L. SOLOMON, R. STEVENSON, &
D. SCHWARTZ, supra note 2, at 302-77; D. VAGTS, BASIC CORPORATION LAW: MATERIALS CASES - TEXT 776-822 (2d ed. 1979).
79. Jennings and Marsh, however, do provide a documentary supplement to their Securities
Regulation casebook for those wanting documentary exemplars when teaching registration under the
Securities Act of 1933. See R. JENNINGS & H. MARSH, SELECTED STATUTES, RULES AND FORMS
UNDER THE FEDERAL SECURITIES LAW (1984). For a transaction-costs explanation of the standard

set of representations and warranties, see Gilson, supra note 27 at 269-73, 276-80.
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For a closer look at the problem, consider the books' treatments of
long-term debt relationships. Students of both books study the "real
law"-the Trust Indenture Act as it restricts on the debt contracting process, the Bankruptcy Act as it cancels and reconstructs debt contracts,

and judicial decisions that interpret debt contracts. Both books prepare
the students for this work by describing the contents of debt contracts.
But the preparation proves inadequate. Not having studied the debt contracts themselves, most of the students will not have achieved a concrete
understanding of the contracts' structure and risk-allocating function.

Without this understanding, the "real law" material comes across as very
technical and somewhat mysterious.8 0

It need not be left to practice to fill in complete pictures of these
relationships. Examples of bonds and notes, business covenants, issuer
prepayment provisions, conversion provisions, preferred stock priority

provisions, representations and warranties of issuers, merger partners,
and stock and asset sellers, and other financial contracting devices could
80. Brudney & Chirelstein excerpt Dewing's descriptions of the sorts of provisions customarily

included in debt contracts. See BRUDNEY & CHIRELSTEIN, CORPORATE FINANCE, supra note 1,at
84-85 (quoting 1 A. DEWING, THE FINANCIAL POLICY OF CORPORATIONS 173-74 (5th ed. 1953)).
Hamilton makes a similar move by including the table of contents from the Model Simplified Indenture. See R. HAMILTON, supra note 5, at 272-74 (quoting Model Simplified Indenture, 38 Bus. LAW
741, 745-47 (1983)).
Contract forms are important starting points in a corporate law pedagogy centered on contractual relationships. Once he has mastered the structure of the relationship, the student can be taken
on to the law that regulates the structure and the economic theory that explains the structure. This
pedagogic assertion rests on an assumption similar to the assumption that studying primary source
legal material is valuable. Teaching contract relations without teaching the contracts has the same
limitations as teaching a Contracts course out of a hornbook.
Professor Gilson, also arguing for the teaching of contractual relationships in the corporate law
curriculum, would leave out the contract forms and look only to economic theory for relational
teaching materials. See Gilson, supra note 27, at 303-06. In his view, contract forms, like other
practice-oriented subject matter, cannot be adapted to the law school environment:
Among a number of problems . . . is that most legal academics are not really competent to
teach these skills; the career patterns of teachers at leading law schools typically do not
reflect sufficient time in practice to have themselves perfected the skills that this approach
to business law education would require . . . . Law firms and real practitioners, through
some form of apprenticeship, are likely to do a far better job than any law school for a
number of reasons.
Id. at 304 (footnotes omitted). While these comments are persuasive with respect to teaching practitioner arts like negotiation and drafting, they are not persuasive with respect to teaching contract
forms. Notwithstanding the understandable desire of practitioners to mystify their deals and dealmaking, their contract forms, or exemplars of them taken from real transactions, can be employed by
legal academics teaching contractual relationships. An academic with only limited exposure to practice can explicate a contractual text without command of the practical skills necessary to create such
documents in real world situations.
If, in redirecting corporate law academic endeavors to the combined study of theory and practice in business relationships, we underplay legal practice too much, we delegitimate ourselves somewhat. Without a practical legal component, the work might as well be done in the university's
economics department.
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be integrated into a Corporate Finance casebook. Such materials would

show economic interests being translated into complex legislation by
those directly affected. Thus, exposure to them would advance students'

understanding of the interworkings of law and economic forces. Exposure to them also would give students a concrete contextual basis upon
which to study and evaluate the real law of finance.

It is fair to argue that students find this sort of material boring and
frustrating. But it is fair to reply that curricular staples like federal tax
regulations and the Rule 140 series under the Securities Act of 1933
hardly differ in this regard, and exemplars of complex finance contracts

considerably better drafted than such legislation are not hard to find. It
also is fair to argue that complex contract materials impose more intense

technical demands than does much of the "real law" of corporations.
And it is fair to reply that the meaning and inner mechanics of complex
contract provisions can be made quite accessible with the inclusion of

problem sets to guide the student, and we should be seeking out technically demanding materials for advanced corporate courses in any event. 81

Unexpected support for a contractual adjustment of the Corporate
Finance course can be found in some recent corporate law scholarship.
This work, following the social sciences, seeks to describe and explain
business relationships rather than to summarize and sharpen or rewrite

the legal doctrine governing them. These legal scholars 2 in effect have
joined with a group of economists8 3 in a search for explanations of the
interconnected legal constructs in which economic activities occur in and
around the firm. The significance accorded to private contracting varies
depending on the particular work and the philosophical perspectives underlying it. When the work comes from Chicago school economists, an

underlying anti-positivism 84 brings contract to the fore, normatively and
81. Those in search of antidotes to "third-year malaise" should consider introducing students
to materials that bear on their futures and simultaneously challenge their legal reading and comprehension skills. The exercise calls for fortitude, but has its rewards if undertaken with conviction.
82. See, eg., Easterbrook & Fischel, Voting in Corporate Law, 26 J.L. & ECON. 395 (1983);
Klein, supra note 36; Levmore, Monitors and Freeridersin Commercial and CorporateSettings, 92
YALE L.J. 49 (1982).
83. There are different schools of thought here. For a look at some of them, see Jensen &
Meckling, Theory of the Firmv ManagerialBehavior, Agency Costs and Ownership Structure, 3 J.
FiN. ECON. 305 (1976); Fama, Agency Problems and the Theory of the Firm, 88 J. POL. ECON. 288
(1980); Fama & Jensen, Separation of Ownership and Control, 26 J.L. & EcON. 301 (1983), and
Scott, CorporationLaw and the American Law Institute Corporate Governance Project, 35 STAN. L.
REV. 927 (1983) (demonstrating the influence this work has among legal scholars). For the other
school of thought, see Williamson, Corporate Governance, 93 YALE L.J. 1197 (1984); and Williamson, The Modern Corporation: Origins,Evolution, Attributes, 19 J. ECON. Lrr. 1537 (1981).
84. Professor Arthur Jacobson describes anti-positivists as follows:
These critics of modem positivism abhor a system in which the sole effective source of
order is the state apparatus. Society, they reflect, is abundant with spontaneous arrange-
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doctrinally. Here the firm is conceived as a "bundle of contracts, ' 85 and
under the efficiency principle, private contractual concepts are employed
to justify real law. To these scholars, corporate law is justified to the

extent that it saves contracting costs for private parties. Other work
brings contract into an overarching and more collectivist vision of

human relationships. The so-called Relationalists look past the conventional divisions of legal subject matter to view corporate law as one of

many branches of a law of relational contracts. They are more eclectic in

finding principles to justify real law.8 6 Whichever perspective is em-

ployed, the traditional "real law" subject matter limitations of the legal
academy tend to be disregarded.
This work admits contracting patterns to parity with statutes and

judicial gap-filling rules as meaningful sources of business law. It invites
a unitary study of the firm's financial structure which considers all regu-

lations playing a significant role in the firm's structure and governanceinvestment contracts and merger and asset sale contracts as well as state
and federal corporation laws and judicial opinions. The different sources
in the
of authority-contractual assent in one case, and sovereign power
87
other-although relevant, should not circumscribe the inquiry.
If we turn these perspectives to law teaching, we begin to see that
the traditional "real law" bias need not inevitably control Corporate Fi-

nance pedagogy. The bias no longer controls corporate law scholarship.
And contracting patterns have an obvious practical bearing on the study

of the lawyer's role in corporate finance.
IV.

CONCLUSION

The challenge to the editor of the next Corporate Finance casebook

is clear. The bounds on the present curricular concept can be relaxed to
ments among persons, formed without the state's aid and enabling authority. Persons are
the source of energy and order in the economy and in cultural life ....
Law, to these anti-positivists, is neither legislation nor enforcement. It is the ratification or restoration of spontaneous arrangements. . . . It forces, or threatens to force,
only what persons agree shall be forced. The principles of law, therefore, are coterminous
with the principles of contract.
Jacobson, The Private Use ofPublicAuthority: Sovereignty and Associations in the Common Law, 29
BUFFALO L. Rv.599, 612-13 (1980).
85. For a brief summary of this "modem theory of the firm," see Kraakman, CorporateLiability Strategies and the Costs of Legal Controls, 93 YALE L.J. 857, 862-64 (1984). *The doctrinal case
for the bundle of contracts theory is set out in Hessen, A New Concept of Corporations:A Contractual and PrivatePropertyModel, 30 HASTINGS L.J. 1327, 1334-36 (1979). For a critique of Hessen's
position, see Frug, supra note 29, at 1305-07. For the doctrinal argument opposing the bundle of
contracts theory, see Jacobson, supra note 84, at 612-15.
86. See generally MacNeil, supra note 56.
87. Ultimately, of course, sovereign power enters into contractual relations as a source of enforcement power. See generally Jacobson, supra note 81.
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admit both more theory and more practice. There is room to include
more theoretical discussion, political and economic. A double contractual dimension can be added to the course. Adding contract exemplars
can draw the course closer to the practical world. Adding exemplars of
theoretical thinking on the contractual structure of the firm can introduce the student to a further area of academic concern. Such innovations should benefit all of the course's varied constituencies.

